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We provide an axiomatization-based justiﬁcation for applying the Owen value to
decompose  2 in OLS models if prior knowledge can be used to form groups of
regressor variables. The assumptions made by the axioms are not only plausible
with respect to the variables but also clarify the meaning of the exogenous grouping
of variables.





The Shapley (1953) value can be used to decompose goodness-of-ﬁt measures of regres-
sion models—such as R2—into contributions of individual regressor variables (Chevan
and Sutherland, 1991; Johnson and LeBreton, 2004). In many practical applications
there are good reasons to think in terms of groups of regressors if they represent similar
explanatory concepts, e.g. a polynomial in labor market experience, dummy variables
created from a categorical variable, or savings and investment rates in a growth model.
In such situations, it is desirable to decompose the model’s  2 into contributions of
groups and—if of interest—to allocate each group’s share to its constituent variables.
The Owen (1977) value provides an obvious candidate for a decomposition procedure
incorporating exogenously deﬁned groups (Shorrocks, 1999).
An obstacle to wide-spread application of  2 decomposition in applied work may
have been confusion about the implied assumptions. We argue that the Owen value  2
decomposition arises under very mild and plausible assumptions. It is also attractive
in many practical settings inasmuch as it usually allows for models with more regressor
variables if not all groups contain only a single variable. If all groups are singletons,
though, the Owen value coincides with the Shapley value. Thus, the proposed procedure
can be regarded as a generalization of the Shapley value  2 decomposition. After a
presentation of the method and its theoretical underpinnings, we provide an illustrative
example for a wage regression with German data.
12 Method
Let   = {1,..., ,..., } denote the set of explanatory variables or—in the language of
game theory—the set of players. With the interpretation mentioned in the introduction,
we may group the variables and obtain the partition   = { 1,..., ℓ,...,  }. Estimation
of the full OLS model
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gives the  2 ( ) to be distributed. To this end, running a regression for every combina-
tion of variables   ⊆   and the resulting  2 ( ) will be considered. Since a regression
without any variable but the intercept yields zero explained variance, we face a so-called
cooperative game with transferable utility and a coalition structure (CS-game) with
player set  , coalition function  2 : 2  −→ ℝ,  2 (∅) = 0, where 2  denotes the power
set of  , and coalition structure  .
A solution concept   prescribes for any given
!
 , 2, 
￿
the variables’ payoﬀs, i.e. it
assigns to every CS-game a vector  
!
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is interpreted
as variable  ’s payoﬀs. Note, a solution   does not attribute a value to the group; how-
ever, summing up the variables’ payoﬀs in a group,
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induces a game played between the groups. It is called the





, where the coalition function assigns to every
set of groups Υ ⊆   its worth via  2
  (Υ) =  2 (∪ ℓ∈Υ ℓ), i.e.  2
  (Υ) is the  2 obtained
from estimation of the OLS model
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2.1 Owen value R2 decomposition
The Owen value is well-suited for a decomposition of  2 ( ) of the full model because
of its characteristic properties and because it is the consistent extension of the Shapley
value.
2.1.1 Axiomatic argument for the Owen value  2 decomposition
Allocation of  2 to (groups of) variables has to involve certain assumptions. In the
following, we impose four assumptions that we regard as plausible.
Eﬃciency: The full model  2 is decomposed among the variables, i.e.
P
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!
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=
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2Symmetry within groups: If  ′ and  ′′ are substitutes according to their explanatory
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Note that this symmetry condition ensures that symmetric players cannot be distin-
guished on the grounds of their group aﬃliation.
Symmetry between groups: If  ℓ′ and  ℓ′′ are substitutes according to their ex-
planatory power, they obtain equal valuation, i.e.,
 2
  (Υ ∪ { ℓ′}) =  2
  (Υ ∪ { ℓ′′}) for all Υ ⊆  ∖{ ℓ′, ℓ′′}
implies
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That is to say that one abstracts from the number of variables in a group and raises
groups on an equal level. If, e.g., a long list of grouped dummy variables has the same
predictive power as a single variable group, the dummies in total receive the same share
as the single variable.
Monotonicity: A change of the observations that leads to new coeﬃcients of determi-
nation ˜  2 such that variable   exhibits higher marginal contributions, must not decrease
the explanatory value attributed to variable  , i.e.,
˜  2 (  ∪ { }) − ˜  2 (  ∪ { }) ≥  2 (  ∪ { }) −  2 (  ∪ { }) for all   ⊆  ∖{ }
implies   
￿
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For practical purposes, this condition introduces a kind of merit principle: variables
with higher marginal contributions receive a higher payoﬀ.
Theorem 1 (Khmelnitskaya and Yanovskaya, 2007) The Owen value satisﬁes
eﬃciency, symmetry within groups, symmetry between groups, and monotonicity.1
The theorem employs axioms that refer to the abstract groups only for symmetry
conditions. In contrast, the powerful monotonicity condition refers directly to the vari-
ables.
2.1.2 Relation to the axioms characterizing the Shapley value
The Shapley value is promoted in the literature to be applied for decomposing the
 2 if the variables are ungrouped. Indeed, the model and the characterization above
1In the more general class of CS-games, the Owen value is actually the only value that satisﬁes these
conditions.
3generalize the Shapley value  2 decomposition in the sense that if   is the atomistic
partition or consists of only one group—i.e. if the variables cannot be distinguished with
respect to  —, the framework above captures the ungrouped situation. Moreover, in
this case the Owen value  2 decomposition equals the Shapley value  2 decomposition.
To see this, adapt the eﬃciency and monotonicity properties above to the case where no
coalition structure   exists. Further, the symmetry conditions above must be replaced
by the following property, and the previous theorem unfolds as a generalization of the
well-known result of Young (1985).
Symmetry: If variables  ′ and  ′′ are substitutes according to their explanatory power,
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Corollary 2 The Shapley value satisﬁes eﬃciency, symmetry, and monotonicity.
2.2 Formulas for the Shapley value and the Owen value
In addition to the theorem above, it is useful to develop an intuition about what drives
the solutions. We therefore provide both, intuitive formulas referring to marginal con-
tributions and those used for computation.
2.2.1 Calculation of the Shapley value
We want to consider permutations of  , i.e. bijective mappings   :   → {1,...,∣ ∣}
where   ( ) is interpreted as the position of player   in  . The set of all  ! permutations
on   is referred to by Π( ). For a given  , the predecessors of player   form a set
denoted by   
  = { ′ ∣   ( ′) <   ( )}. A player  ’s marginal contribution (if players are
ordered according to   ∈ Π( )) is given by  2
￿
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Note that the Shapley value does not account for a partition. Further, if player   is a Null




For the actual computation we use the so-called potential function (Hart and Mas-
Colell, 1989), deﬁned recursively by   ( ) =  2 ( )/∣ ∣ +
P
 ∈    ( ∖{ })/∣ ∣ and
  (∅) = 0 since   ( )−  ( ∖{ }) =  ℎ 
!
 , 2￿
. Calculation of the Shapley value this
way avoids employing  ! permutations. For faster computation, we obtain  2 ( ) from
4the covariance matrix of the data rather than from the original observations (Grömping,
2006, p. 13).
2.2.2 Groups, the Owen value, and the Shapley value
We present two approaches to the Owen value, the ﬁrst of which applies permutations.
We say that a permutation   is compatible with respect to the partition   if each group’s
members appear contiguously in the permutation with no player from another group in
between, i.e. for  ,  ∈  ℓ ∈   we have   ( ) ≤   ( ) ≤   ( ) implies   ∈  ℓ. Let Π( , )
denote the set of all permutations on   that are compatible with  . The Owen value
can be obtained from
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In words, variable  ’s marginal contribution to explanatory value does only count if the
groups to which   does not belong to are either completely present or completely absent.
Second, departing from the Shapley value, one may derive the Owen value as follows.
If all variables constitute groups of their own such that   ={{1},...,{ },...,{ }}, then
each group should be treated as if it were a variable. In general, the distribution of





suggests itself (one may ignore the partition whenever applying the Shapley value). It





among the variables in  ℓ.
Consider the case when all variables belong to one group,  ℓ =   and   ={ ℓ}. It
is desirable to have the same procedure within  ℓ as if there was no grouping. For that,
denote for every subgroup   ⊆  ℓ the value of that subgroup by  2 ( ). Then apply
the Shapley value on the resulting internal game
!
 ℓ, 2￿
. If all variables are in  ℓ, we
have  2 ( ) =  2 ( ) and observe  ℎ 
!
 ℓ, 2￿








calls for a reasonable prescription of the worth  2 ( ). This
can be achieved as follows: Let   participate in the game between groups instead of






. Application of the Shapley value on the resulting internal game yields
the Owen value, i.e. for   ∈  ℓ we have
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Note that as a consequence of this setup, the payoﬀs of the variables of a particular
group sum up to the Shapley value from the external game of the respective group, i.e.
we have
P
 ∈ ℓ    
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53 Application to German wage data
As an illustration of the method we estimate an augmented Mincer regression model for
male workers in Germany. Our focus is on the importance of human capital measures on
wages. We use data from the 2006 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP),
which features a symbol-digit correspondence test (SCT) for those participants who
took the CAPI interview (Wagner et al., 2007; Lang, 2005).2 The outcome of this test
reﬂects, to a certain degree, innate cognitive abilities, and these could be regarded as
important for an individual’s work productivity. To simplify interpretation, we rescale
SCT such that it varies between 0 (lowest score) and 1 (highest score). The other
human capital variables we consider are years of schooling (EDUC), actual years of
work experience (EXPER), and years of employment at the current ﬁrm (TENURE).3
Apart from human capital, we consider whether a man is married (yes/no), the size of
the ﬁrm (4 categories), industry codes (7 categories), and regions within Germany (15
categories).4 The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of hourly earnings. We
restrict the sample to male German citizens, aged 20–64 years, who worked for at least
10 hours per week, were not self-employed, and not disabled. This leaves us with 850
observations with valid data.
The overall  2 of our model is 0.497 (Table 1). More than half (55.9%) of this result—
or 28% of the entire variation in log wages—can be attributed to the human capital
variables in the model, whereas the second-largest group, regional disparity, accounts
for only one sixth of the explained variance. Further decomposition of the  2 share
of human capital reveals that the main eﬀect of EDUC is the single most “important”
variable, with a 22% share of the overall  2. A similar magnitude is achieved by the
labor market and ﬁrm experience variables, though, if we sum up their respective Owen
value shares (22.8%). Despite its “large” coeﬃcient and statistical signiﬁcance, the main
eﬀect of cognitive ability does not turn out to be very important in terms of explanatory
power. Its interaction term with EDUC, however, contributes 8.1% of the model’s  2.
The coeﬃcients imply that up to about 16 years of schooling, greater cognitive abilities
result in higher earnings.5
Calculating conﬁdence intervals for our results is a computationally tedious task,
since we rely on the bootstrap method. Figure 1 presents conﬁdence intervals for the
absolute group or Owen values (without standardizing by  2), on the basis of 2000
2See Anger and Heineck (2010) for a more detailed analysis of wages and SCT based on the GSOEP
and Isreali (2007) for a decomposition analysis for a wage regression model.
3EDUC is measured as years of schooling that would be necessary to achieve the person’s highest
school or college degree, irrespective of how long it actually took.
4The regions are equivalent to German Laender (NUTS 1) with the exception of Rhineland-Palatinate
and Saarland, which are one region in the GSOEP.
5Measurement error in our indicator of cognitive ability could be responsible for relatively low pre-
dictive power. Suﬃce to say, measurement error is a general problem in empirical work, not only when
decomposing goodness of ﬁt.
6Table 1: Wage regression results
 2 decomposition (%)
Group / regressor Coef. Group Owen
Human capital (6 variables)∗∗ 55.9
SCT 0.783∗ 3.0






Firm size (3 dummies)∗∗ 15.7
Industry (6 dummies)∗∗ 5.8
Region (14 dummies)∗∗ 16.6
Intercept 0.527∗
Observations 850
Overall  2 0.497
Remarks:
∗/
∗∗ denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% / 5% level for
individual variables (t-test) or groups of dummy variables (F-test), based
on the heteroscedasticity-robust covariance matrix.
bootstrap replications.6 With 90% conﬁdence we ﬁnd that between one quarter and
about one third of the entire variation in log wages can be attributed to human capital.
4 Concluding remarks
Decomposition of goodness-of-ﬁt can be an attractive diagnostic tool for the identiﬁca-
tion of important (groups of) explanatory variables in a given model. Unlike statistical
signiﬁcance,  2 is not a function of the number of observations. Another practical ap-
plication could consist in the judgment of the value of control variables in the context
of survey design, if preliminary data already exist and if data collection is costly.
Both the Shapley and the Owen value reﬂect average marginal contribution to  2. As
such, a non-zero value may be assigned even to a variable that exhibits a zero coeﬃcient
in the full model. Compared to calculation of the Shapley value for each variable,
decomposition based on the Owen value comes at lower computational cost if prior
knowledge on the grouping of regressors can be exploited.
6Using the software Stata 11.2 (StataCorp, 2009), this bootstrap exercise required about 71/2 minutes
on a desktop PC, whereas estimation of the values in Table 1 only took 1/4 second. A user-written
program and a syntax ﬁle to replicate the results is available upon request from the authors.
7Figure 1: Decomposition results with 90% bootstrap conﬁdence intervals
Human capital
SCT














Absolute contribution to R² Absolute contribution to R
Remarks: Based on 2000 bootstrap replications. Conﬁdence interval for “human capital” group:
[0.246; 0.313].
While the present procedure is conﬁned to the case of linear models with indepen-
dent observations and simple partitions, several extensions can be conceived. First,
groups could be further disaggregated, giving rise to level structures (Winter, 1989).
For instance, labor market experience and its squared term could form an intermediate
group in our application. Second, the model could allow for unit-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects
that control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, so that only the “within- 2” is
decomposed. Third, the method could be applied to non-linear models estimated by the
maximum likelihood method, admittedly at a much higher computational burden. In
this case the likelihood ratio test statistic could be allocated across explanatory entities.
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